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7.1  Introduction 
Attempts to measure the impacts of pensions on household saving have 
occupied much of the literature in empirical public finance over the 
past decade. From a theoretical perspective, identifying the channels 
through which pensions affect the intertemporal consumption decision 
can help to distinguish among motives for saving (e.g., for retirement 
consumption or for bequests) and to explain empirical findings of the 
relationship between wealth and lifetime earnings. Proper quantifica- 
tion of  the effects of pensions on saving is important for analyses of 
intergenerational equity, bequests and income distribution, and tax pol- 
icy and saving. 
Most of the attention in the pension-saving controversy has focused 
on the social security system, beginning with the time series studies 
of Feldstein (1974).  The theoretical argument of Feldstein (and of Barro 
1974, 1978) has centered around the funding status of social security, 
that is, the degree to which an unfunded social security system reduces 
private saving. Empirical tests of the effects of social security on saving 
in this vein have been conducted in the perfect certainty version of the 
life-cycle model (Modigliani and Ando 1957; Modigliani and Brumberg 
1954).* In that approach, social security affects wealth accumulation 
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only through its impact on individual intertemporal budget constraints. 
Disposable income falls by the amount of the tax. To the extent that 
the present value of benefits exceeds the present value of taxes paid, 
an increase in lifetime resources is generated, raising consumption in 
all periods. 
This paper focuses on the distinction of precautionary saving against 
uncertainty over length of life in the life-cycle framework and on the 
annuity insurance aspects of social security and private pensions. The 
development of  public and private pensions is examined in  response 
to missing markets for providing insurance for consumption in the facet 
of uncertain lifetimes. A simple life-cycle model is put forth in section 
7.2 to show that even an actuarially fair, fully funded social security 
system can reduce individual saving by more than the tax paid. Hence, 
previous partial equilibrium estimates of  the impact of social security 
on saving drawn solely from consideration of the intergenerational  wealth 
transfer at the introduction of the system are, if  anything, too small.3 
A related finding stems from the fact that under current United States 
law,  social security taxes  and benefits are calculated only up to an 
earnings ceiling. High-income individuals have incomplete access to 
the social security annuity system. Hence, even in the absence of  an 
explicit bequest motive, the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings could 
rise with the level of lifetime earnings. Constrained access to publicly 
provided pension annuities may provide an impetus to the growth of 
private pension annuities. This potential “annuity rationing” provides 
a motivation for integrating social security and private pension benefit 
formulas. 
Individual wealth-age profiles are constructed in  section 7.3 given 
uncertain lifetimes and social security. The large partial equilibrium 
saving impacts found in section 7.2 are mitigated when initial endow- 
ments are considered. Specifically, accidental bequests, which arise in 
the model because of lifetime uncertainty, provide an intergenerational 
link for saving decisions. To  the extent that the introduction of  social 
security reduces the size of accidental bequests, the net effect of social 
security on the consumption of subsequent generations is diminished. 
Section 7.4 extends the approach to private pensions. The fifth sec- 
tion addresses empirical issues arising from the models of sections 7.3 
and 7.4, primarily with respect to how one should interpret econometric 
estimates of “offsets” to individual saving attributed to pensions. Using 
a model specification for individual wealth accumulation from the lit- 
erature, potential offsets are interpreted according to the presence or 
absence of a bequest motive and according to the ability of individuals 
to adjust their participation  in private pensions to counteract invol- 
untary changes in social security. Some conclusions and directions for 
future research are given in  section 7.6. 177  Uncertain Lifetimes, Pensions, and Individual Saving 
7.2  Social Security and Savings in a Life-Cycle Model 
7.2.1  Consumer Saving Decisions 
The  solution  to  an  economic  agent's  intertemporal  consumption 
problem subject to a lifetime resource constraint requires the equali- 
zation of expected marginal utilities of consumption across time. Oth- 
erwise, an increase in consumption at one point in his life at the expense 
of consumption at another time would raise lifetime utility, indicating 
that the initial allocation was suboptimal. The introduction of uncer- 
tainty generates a demand for insurance to diversify risks. Where in- 
surance markets are incomplete or missing, the first-best optimum may 
be unattainable. 
The type of uncertainty considered here is that over longevity; agents 
do not know when they will die. Yaari's (1965) seminal paper showed 
that with an uncertain lifetime, intertemporal utility maximization can 
dictate  saving for the possibility  of  living longer  than  the expected 
lifetime to avoid deprivation in old age (excessively high marginal utility 
of future cons~mption).~  That excess saving can be large. Kotlikoff and 
Spivak (1981, p. 379) found that for plausible  underlying parameter 
values, the present expected value of unintended bequests represented 
almost 25% of initial wealth for a single male aged 55. 
To emphasize this point, consider the following simple model. Agents 
are assumed to be selfish, in the sense that no bequests are desired. 
The retirement age Q is taken as exogenous, and individuals live Q 
periods for certain. The probability of having died in the interval [OJ] 
is p,  for each t;  by assumption, pt  is equal to zero in the interval [O,Q]. 
Individuals have an expected lifetime of D years, with D' > D being 
the  maximum age to which one can survive. That is, D  is just the 
weighted average of the years t in (Q + 1, D'],  with weights (1 -  p,) 
for each t. Individuals receive a gross wage w,  in each period t during 
their working period; wages are assumed to grow at rate g.  Income 
taxes on wages are levied at rate 8. 
Following Yaari (1965) and Barro and Friedman (1977), let utility be 
additively separable, and let  U(C,)  be evaluated contingent on being 





max C (1 -  p,) U(CJ  (1 + a)-, 
1=0 
D' 
t=O  c C,(1  + r)-, = K"  + (1 - 8)  W"  t=O  2 (a),  1 + Y  ' 178  R. Glenn Hubbard 
where C,  6, and r represent consumption and the (constant) subjective 
discount rate and real interest rate, respectively. KO  represents initial 
resources from unplanned bequests from the previous generation. 
Carrying out the optimization in (1) assuming U(C) = (l/y)Cy yields 
an optimal consumption stream of 
where 
The extent to which uncertainty over length of life affects the stream 
of consumption depends on agents’ degree of relative risk aversion, a 
transformation of y, the elasticity of the marginal utility function. The 
higher is an individual’s degree of relative risk aversion (or, equiva- 
lently, the lower is his intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con- 
sumption), the slower will his consumption grow over time. 
7.2.2  The Introduction of Social Security 
Access to a fair annuity market could remove the influence of lifetime 
uncertainty on consumption. Individuals could exchange a portion of 
their labor income when young to smooth consumption in old age. This 
role of annuities as a mechanism for sharing uncertainty about longevity 
is an integral part of Diamond’s (1977) evaluation of the social security 
system, in which he focuses on the absence of  complete markets for 
such contracts. Merton (1983) considers Pareto-improving  social se- 
curity programs in an intertemporal model in which human capital is 
not tradable. Eckstein et al. (1985) consider the Pareto-improving po- 
tential of  mandatory social security in the context of market failure in 
competitive insurance markets in the presence of adverse selection in 
the paradigm of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) or Wilson (1977). 
If  all individuals  were  identical in terms of  their probabilities  of 
sur~ival,~  then (with risk-neutral insurers) a competitive equilibrium in 
the provision of fair annuities would be possible. The existence of  a 
competitive equilibrium may be precluded by  asymmetries of  infor- 
mation between individuals and insurers. This is, of course, the familiar 
‘‘adverse selection” phenomenon discussed by Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976).6  There may be additional “moral hazard” or “free-rider”  bar- 
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that the state will support them in deprivation, the need to purchase 
annuities is diminished.  A rigorous development of optimal second- 
best provision of annuities is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Public provision of the annuities through public pensions is one pos- 
sibility.’ Moral hazard problems still make voluntary participation dif- 
ficult. Consider, though, a public pension system (“social  security”) 
of the following form. Individuals are compelled to pay a payroll tax 
at rate t, on gross wages, from which the social security system is 
funded. During retirement they receive annuity benefits S in each period 
t until death. The budget constraint in (1) becomes 
D’ 
(4) 
f=O  C cf(l  + r1-f = K~ + (1 - e - t,)  f=O  2 wo(z)f 
Df 
+  c  Sf(l + r)-f. 
f=Q+1 
If benefits are set according to a replacement rate of the terminal wage, 
(i.e., where S  =RwQ,  where R is the earnings replacement rate) then 
the economy-wide actuarially fair benefit S satisfies the condition that8 
D’ 
S  (1 -  p,) (1  + r)-f = I, 
r=Q+I  f=O  (5) 
Substituting the actuarially fair social security benefit into the budget 
constraint in (4)  yields 
where o  arises because of the difference in discount rates under cer- 
tainty and uncertainty and is equal to 
f=Q+l  f=Q+l 
Since w is greater than unity, the system generates an increase in life- 
time resources. Note that this increase in resources occurs even in a 
system which is actuarially fair and fully funded (i.e., in which con- 
tributions are invested and earn the market rate of return r in each 
peri~d).~  In reality, the initial cohorts participating in social security 
received a rate of  return greater than the actuarially fair return (see 
Hurd and Shoven 1983). This analysis focuses only on an actuarially 
fair system to point out that the negative impact of social security on 
individual saving does not hinge on such initial transfers.’O 
We  can compare the gains to individuals from the “insurance” fea- 180  R. Glenn Hubbard 
tures of social security, which would exist even in a fully funded system, 
with the transfer gains to initial participants from an unfunded system 
emphasized by Feldstein (1974) and Kotlikoff (1979a). Hurd and Shoven 
(1983) note  that  the “median  return  ratio”  (i.e., the ratio of  social 
security benefits to contributions) for single individuals in the Retire- 
ment History Survey fell from 2.91 in  1969 to 2.73 in  1975 to 2.41 in 
1979. Despite the large gains for older retirees, their simulations of 
gains for future retirees indicate that projected internal rates of return 
decline markedly after 1980. In the model outlined above, this ratio for 
the funded system would be o.  Assuming a real rate of interest of 4% 
yields a return ratio of 2.1, which is approximately the same size as 
the current transfer effect and potentially much larger than the future 
transfer effect. 
As  shown in  table 7.1, depending on assumptions about the  real 
interest rate and the social security payroll tax rate, the percentage 
increase in lifetime resources  generated by an actuarially fair social 
security system can be large. Using actual data on survival probabilities 
for the U.S.,“ when r = .04 and t, = 0.10, a 21% increase in lifetime 
resources is afforded by an actuarially fair social security system. If 
initial resources were on average equal to 25% of initial lifetime earn- 
ings, this  translates  into a  16.9% increase  in  lifetime consumption. 
Individual saving is reduced by more than the amount of the tax paid. 
Suppose that not everyone has equal access to the retirement an- 
nuities provided by social security, and that effective participation is 
higher for low-income individuals than for high-income individuals. Let 
@ represent the ceiling on taxable income; the growth rate of the taxable 
wage base and the determination of the replacement rate are as before. 
The budget constraint in (6) then becomes 
D’ 
1=0 
where  is is equal to t,(@ho). The impact of  social security on an in- 
dividual’s lifetime resources  depends on his income.  As an annuity, 
social security administered in this way generates a smaller reduction 
in saving for high-income people than for low-income people. 
7.3  Social Security and Dynamic Weaith Accumulation 
7.3.1  Individual Saving Behavior 
We  can use the derivation from the previous section of  the impact 
of  mandatory actuarially fair social security on saving to study indi- 
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(at time 0) of an individual’s accumulated stock of wealth, KO,  (i.e., the 
present value of  the “accidental bequest”  of an individual who died 
in period t), can be expressed as 
Wages and social security benefits are the sources of income to the 
individual. w,  is zero in the interval [Q +  1, D‘],  and S,  is zero in the 
interval [O,Q].  Using the expressions derived before for w,,  S,, and C,, 
we can rewrite (8) as 
t  ir  -i 
2  (1  + r)G  (1  + 6)G(l - 
2 (1 + r)G  (1 + 6)G  (1 -  pi)& 
i=O 




K,,  = K,,  + (1 - e - t,)wO 
f 
i=Q+1 
2  (1 -  pJ(1 + r)-i 
i=Q+  1 
r 
i=O  , t E  [Q +  1, D’I. 
iv  -i 
2 (1  + r)G  (1 + 6) G(1 -  pi)& 
2  (1  + r)G  (1  + S)G  (1 -  pi)G 
ir  -i 
i=O 
To  provide an intuitive framework for considering an individual’s 
wealth accumulation over the life cycle, note that if  we denote the 
present values of lifetime labor income and social security taxes by VL 
and V,, respectively, we can rewrite (9a) and (9b) as 182  R. Glenn Hubbard 
and 
The ratio KojVL  tracks an individual's accumulated stock of assets 
relative to lifetime earnings. In a world of no uncertainty over longevity, 
Ko,/VL is simply a function of age, and the results of the basic life-cycle 
model are reproduced, as long as the present values of  social security 
contributions and benefits are equal. With lifetime uncertainty, wealth 
is still built up relative to earnings during the working period, but the 
rate at which consumption draws down accumulated wealth depends 
on survival probabilities and relative risk aversion. Because an actu- 
arially fair social security system generates an increase in  individual 
lifetime resources, lifetime consumption rises. Much of this increase 
in consumption comes during an individual's working life, as the need 
to save for retirement is reduced. Depending on risk aversion, while 
Table 7.1  Percentage Increase in Lifetime Consumption Generated by 
Actuariallv Fair Social Security 
t, = 0.10  = 0.12  t, = 0.14 
r  = 0.02 
r = 0.04 
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retirement consumption is higher in the presence of  social security, 
dissaving in retirement is likely to be less than in the certainty case.I2 
The problem becomes more complicated when the insurance cov- 
erage provided by social security is not the same across individuals. 
Suppose again that there is a ceiling on the level of earnings against 
which payroll tax rates and replacement rates are calculated. If that 
ceiling is IG in period 0 and grows at the same rate as the wage base, 
then the effective tax rate is not t,, but i3 = t, (IG/wo). In that situation, 
equation (10) reveals that the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings rises 
with the level of lifetime earnings, though at a decreasing rate.I3 This 
nonlinearity of saving rates with respect to lifetime earnings occurs in 
the absence of  any explicit bequest motive. The implications of this 
effect for studies of the relationship between  bequests and lifetime 
resources will be discussed later. 
A related problem surfaces in the consideration of received bequests 
which augment lifetime resources.  If  we let KO  represent the initial 
bequest, then we can rewrite equation (10) as 
and 
f  -i  1 
I-" 
As in the case of labor income, the rate at which lifetime resources 
are consumed depends on survival probabilities and risk aversion. The 
initial capital endowment KO,  which comes here from an accidental 
bequest from the previous generation, raises the individual's  lifetime 
resources, increasing the consumption out of the present value of labor 184  R. Glenn Hubbard 
income and reducing the ratio of accumulated wealth to lifetime earn- 
ings. In the case in which participation in social security annuities is 
higher  for  low-income  individuals,  initial  wealth  endowments  may 
smooth the nonlinearity in earnings of savings rates brought about by 
such a social security system. 
To quantify the impact of social security and bequests on individual 
consumption and wealth-age profiles, the model embodied in equation 
(1  1) can be simulated for plausible parameter values. Simulations were 
performed over a set of different values of r, g, 6, and y. The following 
relationships  among the parameters are assumed: r > g, Y  > 6, and 
6 > 0.l4  There is some evidence on the value of y in the literature. In 
their study of household portfolio allocation, Friend and Blume (1975) 
estimated the coefficient of relative risk aversion to be in excess of 2.0, 
implying a value of  y of at most -  1.0. Farber’s (1978) estimation of 
preferences of United Mine Workers from collective bargaining agree- 
ments yielded estimates of  the coefficient of  relative risk aversion of 
3.0 and 3.7. Here we use three alternative values of y:  0.25, - 1.0, 
and -3.0; g is assumed to equal 0.02, while r  = 0.04, and 6 = 0.O3.ls 
Table 7.2 reports Kor/VL for selected ages. The optimization begins 
at  age 20; individuals are assumed to retire  at age  65. Figures are 
expressed as differences from the no-social-security  case. Column  1 
reports  values  in the absence of  social security, but with an initial 
bequest equal to 25%  of lifetime earnings. Column 2 reports the re- 
duction in KoJVL when the individual participates in a social security 
system in which is = t, = 0.14. The third column shows the reduction 
in KOJVL for an individual whose effective tax rate (participation) in 
the system is only half of the nominal rate. Finally, the fourth column 
shows the change in the wealth-age profile for an individual with an 
initial bequest equivalent to 25% of his lifetime earnings and for whom 
t, = tJ = 0.14. 
Several interesting patterns emerge. As expected, higher values of 
relative risk aversion (lower values of y) encompass higher wealth in 
all periods, particularly in old age. Given uncertainty over longevity 
with no social security, an initial bequest of 25% of lifetime earnings 
is  almost  completely  consumed  by  age  75  when  y  = 0.25. When 
y  = -  1.0, however, about  13% remains; nearly 20% remains in  the 
case in which y  =  -3.0. 
The second and third columns, which address the implied resource 
gains made possible by access to actuarially fair social security, display 
the reduction in KIV,  attributable to social security (when t, = 0.14). 
When the effective tax rate is less than the nominal tax rate, the re- 
duction in KIVL is smaller. Hence, effective participation in social se- 
curity which declines with increases in income, ceteris paribus, leads 
to saving rates which rise with earnings (and, afortiori, stocks of wealth 
which rise with earnings). As y is decreased (higher relative risk aver- 185  Uncertain Lifetimes, Pensions, and Individual Saving 
Table 7.2  Social Security and Ko,/VL 
KO 
t, = 0, -  = .25 
VL 
t, =  r,  = .14  i,  = .07,  r,  = .14  KO 
VL 
r,  = r,  = .14, -  = .25 
y = 0.25 
40  .I50  -  .208  -  .lo4  -  .057 
50  .I04  -  .296  -  .148  -  .192 
65  ,041  -  ,393  -  .196  -  ,337 
70  ,025  -  ,336  -  .168  -.311 
75  ,014  -  .273  -  ,137  -  .260 
80  .006  -  .222  -.111  -  .215 
y =  -1.00 
40  ,155  -  ,201  -  .lo1  -  .046 
50  .114  -  .282  -  ,141  p.  168 
65  .060  -  .386  -  ,193  -  .326 
70  ,044  -  ,330  -.175  -  .306 
75  ,031  -  ,321  p.161  -  .290 
80  .020  -  .298  -.I50  -  ,279 
y  =  -3.00 
40  ,160  -  .I95  -  .097  -  ,035 
50  ,122  ,272  p.136  -  .150 
65  .072  -  .362  -  ,181  -  ,307 
70  .057  -  ,333  -  .I77  -  ,276 
75  .044  -  .304  -  .152  -  .260 
80  .033  -  .282  -  ,141  -  ,250 
NOTE:  Entries represent differences in Ko,/VL  from the no-social-security case. 
sion), the social security system permits greater wealth decumulation 
in old age. In other words, the more risk averse the individual, the less 
of  the “income effect” of  social security participation consumed prior 
to retirement. Those findings are intuitive, since the value of  annuity 
is highest for very risk-averse individuals. 
The last column of  table 7.2 shows the combined  impact on the 
wealth-age profile of the combination of effective participation in social 
security at the nominal rate (14% here) and the receipt of  an initial 
bequest. From the information in the first column of table 7.2 and from 
a comparison of the second and fourth columns, most of the impact of 
initial bequests on consumption occurs prior to retirement. That is, the 
differences in KIV, in old age (with respect to the no-social-security 
case) are almost invariant to the initial bequest (at least in the range 
examined here). 
We  can now consider the issue of  the consumption pattern of the 
elderly, addressed earlier by Mirer (1979) and by Davies (1981). Given 
uncertainty  over length of  life, the rapid  reduction  in  consumption 186  R. Glenn Hubbard 
(relative to lifetime resources) in old age confirms the findings in Davies 
(1981) that positive  net worth may continue indefinitely after retire- 
ment. The resulting slow decline (or possible increase) in net worth in 
retirement ignores, however, the decline  in the value  of  the social 
security annuity. Since the model implies that individuals acknowledge 
the actuarial value of their social security holdings, that dissaving must 
take place. 
For each year t in retirement, withdrawals to finance consumption 
relative to lifetime earnings can be expressed as 
1 
-  p,)G 
c*  (12)  -  =  Df 
vL  2 (1 + r)h/(1-7)  (1  + 6)-i/(l-v)  (1 -  pi)ll(1-v) 
i=O 
Correspondingly, in each year t, the decline in  the annuity value of 
social security relative to lifetime earnings is 
The relationship between these two uses of total (pension plus non- 
pension wealth) depends on y and the distribution of survival proba- 
bilities. To see the importance of considering the “dissaving” of annuity 
wealth, table 7.3 contrasts consumption and annuity revaluations in 
retirement of the case of y  = -  1,  ts = 0.14,  r  = 0.04,  and 6 = 0.03.16 
Note that annuity dissaving (the reduction in the actuarial value of the 
social security annuity) is substantially greater than the reduction in 
nonpension wealth. 
To estimate correctly the net effect of social security on individual 
consumption and wealth accumulation after the commencement of the 
system, we must also consider its impact on intergenerational transfers 
(here, accidental  bequests).  By  affecting the accidental bequests  of 
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previous generations, social security further influences individual con- 
sumption patterns. It is to this issue which we now turn. 
7.3.2  Long-Run Effects on Individual Saving 
Given uncertainty over length of life, an actuarially fair social se- 
curity system can reduce individual saving by more than the amount 
of the taxes paid. For plausible underlying assumptions about individual 
discount rates, survival probabilities, and the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution in consumption, the magnitude of that reduction is sub- 
stantial. The partial equilibrium conclusion is clear-estimates of the 
reduction in individual saving brought about by social security which 
focuses only on the extent to which the system delivers a present value 
of anticipated benefits greater the present value of taxes paid are, if 
anything,  an  underestimate.  Before  discussing  general  equilibrium 
interpretations of this finding (in the sense that the wage rate and real 
interest rate are endogenous and respond to changes in the saving rate), 
it is important to address the issue raised in the simulation exercises 
of the links among generations provided by accidental bequests. 
An initial bequest from an “early death” of one’s parent raises the 
beneficiary’s consumption relative to lifetime earnings. In the model, 
the size of that bequest depends on the testator’s coverage by social 
security and his age at death. By facilitating greater consumption out 
of lifetime earnings, social security reduces the accidental bequest. On 
that account, the initial resources available to the heir (and, from table 
7.2, consumption when young) are lower. Even within the partial equi- 
librium analysis, the impact of social security on the consumption and 
saving patterns of  individuals in a given generation depends on the 
balance between the effective increase in lifetime resources made pos- 
sible by  access to a fair annuity and  the reduction  in inheritances 
because of that impact on the saving of the previous generation.’’ 
To  see this  more clearly, note that for an individual receiving an 
accidental bequest from a “parent”  who died at age t in the interval 
[Q + 1,D‘],  the reduction in the bequest because of the parent’s par- 
ticipation in social security is1* 188  R. Glenn Hubbard 
We  know from the individual’s optimization problem that  social se- 
curity generates an increase in lifetime resources of  V,(o - 1). If the 
“parent”  and “child”  have the same lifetime earning potential  (i.e., 
the same wo),  then the net effect of social security is to increase lifetime 
resources by the amount E, where 
E  = V,(w - 1)  1 -  (1  + r)l x  [ 
Note that  if  the parent  lived to the  maximum age, then  E = 0. In 
general, the net increment to lifetime resources  E made possible by 
social security depends on the age at  which the parent  died  (mag- 
nitude  of  the  accidental  bequest).l9  To  consider  the  net  effect  of 
social security on saving n generations after its introduction,  an  n- 
generational analogue  to equation  (15) could  be  constructed  given 
the ages of  death of  previous testators. The role of  family mortality 
history is important here, as individuals whose  “ancestors”  all died 
early will receive large bequests relative to those whose parent lived 
a long time. 
Members  of  the  first  generation  to participate  in  the  social  se- 
curity  system  benefit  in  two  respects,  as  their  lifetime  resources 
are augmented  both  by  the bequests from the (uninsured)  previous 
generation  and  the  gains  from  participation  in  the  social  security 
annuity  system.  The reduced  value  of  accidental bequests  permits 
smaller  consumption gains  for  subsequent  generations.  While  it  is 
true that social security reduces individual saving to a lesser degree 
in  the  generations  after  its  introduction,  there  is  still  a  reduction 
in  the long-run capital  stock.  Ultimately,  to consider  the  potential 
welfare gains from compulsory pensions,  the trade-off  between the 
benefits  to  early participants  from  access to the  annuities and  the 
costs to generations  that  follow  of  a lower  capital  stock  must  be 
examined. 189  Uncertain Lifetimes, Pensions, and Individual  Saving 
7.3.3  General Equilibrium Effects of Social Security on the Capital 
Stock 
The partial equilibrium effects of social security on individual saving 
will be dampened in a general equilibrium analysis of the impact of 
social security on aggregate capital formation.20  The reduction in in- 
dividual wealth  accumulation brought  about  by  social  security will 
induce changes in factor returns, exhibiting both income and substi- 
tution effects on consumption. A higher real interest rate decreases 
lifetime resources; in addition, a higher rate of  interest reduces the 
price of consumption in old age. 
Kotlikoff (1979a), using a life-cycle model with no uncertainty over 
longevity and a Cobb-Douglas production technology, considered the 
impact of a pay-as-you-go social security system on the capital stock 
in a general equilibrium. For plausible parameter values, he found that 
the positive lifetime wealth increment traceable to social security (be- 
cause of growth of the wage base) caused a 20% steady-state reduction 
in the capital stock in the general equilibrium.2*  While this is certainly 
substantial, it is roughly half of his partial equilibrium effect, which is 
directly related to the extent to which benefits are unfair (i.e., to the 
extent that the present value of benefits exceeds the present value of 
social security taxes paid). 
While detailed general equilibrium simulations are not performed 
here, some simple calculations illustrate the basic points outlined above. 
Suppose output is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production 
function in capital and effective labor, with a capital share of one third. 
Factor markets are assumed to be competitive, so that capital and labor 
are paid their marginal products. Again, labor is inelastically supplied, 
and labor-augmenting technical change is assumed to occur at a con- 
stant rate of 2%;  let the population growth rate be 1%. Let the indi- 
vidual's optimization problem be parameterized by r = 0.06,6 = 0.03, 
and y = -  1  .OO;  the average propensity to consume out of total income22 
of about 0.82. 
A fully funded, actuarially fair social security system with t, = 0.10 
reduces the capital stock by about 60%, implying an increase in the 
interest rate of 40%  and a reduction in output of  about 20%. Those 
changes are, of course, upper bounds to the true steady-state changes, 
as both the saving rate and the increase in lifetime consumption afforded 
by social security (indexed by o)  are sensitive to the interest rate. The 
calculations do, however, point  up the need to consider in  welfare 
comparisons both the increase in propensity to consume made possible 
by social security and the effects on consumption of  the reduction in 
output accompanying a smaller capital stock. Access to the social se- 
curity annuities facilitates  an increase in  the average propensity  to 190  R. Glenn Hubbard 
consume (out of total income) of about 16%.  Because of  the fall in 
output, consumption per capital actually falls in the new steady state. 
If  the output-reducing effect were large enough, lifetime welfare of a 
representative  agent  could actually decline in the new  steady state 
following the introduction of social security. 
7.4  Application to Private Pensions 
To the extent that high-income individuals (those for whom wo  > W) 
are constrained to less than their desired participation in social security, 
there is excess demand for social security annuities. Adverse selection 
and the possibility of multiple insurance23  still render unlikely the pro- 
vision  of  such annuities by  competitive insurance  companies.  Em- 
ployer-sponsored private pension funds may act to fill this gap. Em- 
ployers are likely to have better information on individual workers’ life 
expectancies than would a disinterested insurance company. Second, 
by definition, such annuities can only be purchased at an individual’s 
place of  work; multiple insurance is not possible. Finally, the pension 
instrument may provide an added degree of freedom for the firm in 
influencing worker behavior.24 
The tax treatment of pension plans is an important consideration. 
Social security taxes are levied on gross earnings, and prior to the 1983 
amendments to the Social Security Act, benefits were not considered 
taxable income. For private pension plans, employer contributions are 
a deductible business expense and are not regarded as taxable income 
to employees until benefits are paid. Pension fund earnings accumulate 
tax-free until disbursement. Upon distribution, taxes paid on benefits 
are presumably less than corresponding wage tax payments, since earn- 
ings (and hence tax rates) are lower in retirement. Moreover, special 
retirement income credits further diminish effective tax rates on pen- 
sion benefits. 
At this point, we will assume that covered workers take their par- 
ticipation in plans as given; the implications of relaxing that assumption 
will  be  discussed  later.  For  simplicity, let  P  be the actuarially fair 
pension benefit in retirement (determined by the product of a replace- 
ment rate and the terminal wage) corresponding to an implicit reduction 
in wages at rate tp.25 
In the context of this model, the worker bears only (1 - 8)tp  of the 
wage reduction, where 8 is the marginal income tax rate. Benefits are 
taxed at rate 8, where 8 > 8.  We  introduce a parameter  P to measure 
the extent to which benefits received are actuarially fair. That is, an 
actuarially fair pension benefit P can be constructed just as in the case 
of social security annuity benefits in equation (5).  Benefits received are 
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D' 
P c  (1 -  pJ(1 + r)-t = tp 
t-Q+  1  i=o  (16) 
For received annuity payments to be actuarially fair, it must be the 
case that p = 1; less than fair benefits are associated with p < 1. 
Given participation in social security, the budget constraint in (7) can 
be rewritten as 
nr 
= KO  + (1 - 0 - iJ(1 - tp)  t=O  E  wo(+)' 
As shown before, w > 1. As long as p is close to unity, for any rea- 
sonable assessment of the relationship between 8 and 6, (1 -  6)pw  > 
1 - 0 - is. This is certainly true for the estimated tax rates used by 
the Treasury in calculating the tax expenditure associated with pension 
tax subsidies, namely, 0  = 0.23 and6 = 0.115 (seeMunnell1982, p. 44, 
for details). Because of the tax deductibility of pension contributions, 
even in a world of certainty over longevity (w  = l), a funded private 
pension  can  still generate  an increase  in lifetime resources for the 
individual. 
The tax treatment of  pension  contributions reinforces the role of 
private pension annuities in alleviating the rationing of public annuities. 
The effective contribution rates (participation rates) in the public and 
private pension systems both depend on the income of  the individual. 
Recall that t, = t, (a/wo),  where  is the ceiling on taxable earnings. 
Under a progressive tax system, the marginal tax rate also depends on 
income, that is, 0 ' (wo)  > 0. Hence for given (assigned) nominal par- 
ticipation rates in  social security and private pensions,  high-income 
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from private pensions of the sort described here. This effect may be 
desirable if  one reason for the private pension system is to supplement 
the rationed access to social security annuities for high-income work- 
ers. Capital-market imperfections and borrowing restrictions would still 
limit the demand for pension annuities. 
We  can now reconstruct the wealth-age profiles given both  social 
security and private pensions. Wages and public and private pension 
annuity payments are the sources of income to the individual. In the 
interval [Q + 1, D’],  w,  is zero and S, and P,  are zero in the interval 
[O,Q].  Using the expressions derived before for w,,  S,, Pt, and C,  and 
denoting the present values of  lifetime labor income, social security 
taxes, and implicit wage reductions to finance private pensions by VL, 
Vs,  and Vp,  respectively, we can construct wealth-age profiles relative 
to lifetime earnings. That is, 
r  ir  -I 
2 (I  + r)G  (1  + S)G  (1 -  pi)= 
c  (1 + r)G  (1 + S)G  (1 -  pi)= 
i=O 
ir  --I 
i=O 
and 
K,, = 5  + il - 0 - 2)  (1 - 2) 
VL  VL 
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The addition of private pension annuities complicates the evaluation 
of the effect of a change in  compulsory social security holdings on 
nonpension  wealth.  Suppose that individual participation  in  private 
pension annuities is not invariant to changes in social security annuities. 
Let +ps  represent the magnitude of that discretionary adjustment, that 
is, 
+p,  = dVp/dV,. 
Then from equation (18a), the impact of a change in social security 
wealth on the nonpension wealth of a nonretired individual is 
- -  {w - 1 + *J(l  - 6)po -  (1 - 0 - t,)]}  x  dKO, 
dV.9 
(20) -  - 
f  ir  -I  c  (1  + r)G  (1 + S)G  (1 -  p;)L-Y 
c.  (1 + r)G  (1  + S)G (1 -  pi)= 
i=O  iv  --I  7. 
i=O 
If +ps  = 0, then the impact of a change in holdings of social security 
annuities has the same influence on lifetime resources as before. When 
+p,  < 0 (i.e., increases in involuntary social security annuitization can 
be at least partially undone through changes in private pension partic- 
ipation), the impact of social security on individual wealth accumulation 
will also depend on the extent to which private pension annuities are 
actuarially fair (i.e., on the value of p) and on the tax advantages of 
pensions as compensation (values 0 and 6). 
When coverage by  social security is higher for low-wage earners 
than for high-wage earners, we can use equation (13) to examine the 
impact on nonpension wealth of change in the social security payroll 
tax rate (index of participation). First, since the effective tax rate is = 
t, (W/wo),  a given increase in the nominal tax  rate translates into a 
smaller increase in V,  (and, ceteris paribus, a smaller displacement of 
nonpension wealth) for high-income workers (for whom wo  > W)  than 
for low-income workers (for whom 14 > wo).  When private pension 
participation is responsive to changes in social security annuity hold- 
ings (i.e., when +p,  <  0),  then for a given offset factor +p,,,  high-income 
individuals receive a smaller total offset than low-income individuals  .26 
In the next  section, we  take up  issues associated  with  empirical 
treatment of forms of  (18), emphasizing the role of assumptions about 
the structure of  social security and private pensions, the presence or 
absence of a bequest motive, and the extent to which participation in 
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7.5  Empirical Issues 
Gathering econometric evidence of the impact of social security and 
private pension annuities on household saving in the context of lifetime 
uncertainty  entails estimation of  the wealth profiles consistent  with 
equation (18). Suppose one has a cross-section of household or indi- 
vidual data with information on earnings, assets and liabilities, pen- 
sions, and individual and labor-market characteristics. Most previous 
empirical examinations of the impact of social security on nonpension 
wealth have employed versions of the following specification: 
(21)  W; = fly:, A;,  Z;)  - XPWi, 
where i refers to the individual and W, Y,  A, Z,  and PW are nonpension 
wealth, lifetime earnings, age, a vector of socioeconomic variables and 
individual characteristics, and the actuarial present value of anticipated 
pension benefits, respectively. 
Consider for example a wealth accumulation equation of the follow- 
ing form: 
-  + y‘ z;  + E;. 
Anticipated pension benefits are divided into two components, social 
security (SS W)  and private pensions (PPW),  to allow for different ef- 
fects on saving; a, and up are coefficients to be estimated,j  is a function 
of age. Finally, the function g can be specified to test the nonlinearity 
in income of the ratio of wealth to permanent income.27 
Recalling the wealth-age profiles constructed from the theoretical 
model in the previous section, the specification of wealth accumulation 
in (22) illustrates the importance of the inclusion of the pension vari- 
ables. With respect to social security, if individual earnings replacement 
rates are negatively correlated with earnings for high-income workers 
(as in the United States system), the measured effect of  Y  on WIT 
would be biased upward if  the social security variable were omitted. 
The correlation of PPWIY with Y  is less clear. Similarly, if one wanted 
to use (22) to interpret the impact of social security on saving, then 
omitting the private pension variable biases the estimate of a, toward 
zero. The extent of the the bias depends on the degree of “integration” 
of  the benefits of the two systems and on the extent to which private 
pension participation is discretionary. 
Many recent  empirical studies have tried  to isolate the impact of 
pensions on the level of  nonpension saving (using cross-section data) 195  Uncertain Lifetimes, Pensions, and Individual Saving 
in models similar to (21) or (22). Estimating a version of (22) in level 
form, Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) found that an extra dollar of social 
security wealth reduced nonpension wealth by approximately a dollar, 
using data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1962 Survey of Consumer 
Finances; they had no data on private pensions. Some of their speci- 
fications also found a positive relationship between  the ratio of  net 
worth to permanent income and the level of permanent income. Using 
data from the Retirement History Survey, Diamond and Hausman (1984) 
found a social security offset of 30-50 cents (with a smaller nonpension 
wealth  reduction for changes in  private pension  wealth). They also 
found evidence of a positive relationship between WIY and Y. 
Employing a logarithmic form of (22) for Canadian data, King and 
Dicks-Mireaux (1982) estimated the offset to nonpension wealth from 
a  $1  increase in social security wealth  to be 24 cents (10 cents for 
private pensions), with offsets of approximately dollar for dollar for 
individuals in the top decile of the wealth distribution. Hubbard (1983) 
estimated a similar model for the United States (using data from the 
President’s Commission on Pension Policy), finding a mean offset for 
social security wealth of 33 cents (16 cents for private pensions), with 
social security offsets in excess of dollar for dollar for those in the top 
decile of the wealth distribution. 
Whether the versions of (21) and (22) used in the empirical studies 
described above can be justified according to a consistent set of eco- 
nomic assumptions depends on the structure of  annuity markets and 
on whether or not a bequest motive exists. The basic model presented 
earlier assumes  complete market  failure in  the private  provision of 
annuities and the absence of a bequest motive. Theoretical possibilities 
encompass  assumptions  along  the  dimensions  of  “perfectness”  of 
private  annuity markets  and  the presence  or absence of  a bequest 
motive. 
In addition, econometric estimates of the impact of private pension 
annuities on nonpension wealth accumulation as well as of the links 
between  changes  in  social  security  annuities  and  private  pension 
participation  are  necessary  for  an  empirical  consideration  of  the 
impact of the social security system on individual saving. The latter 
link  is  both  important  and not  often  noted.  That  annuity  markets 
are extremely imperfect in  the real world is not evidence per se of 
a severe market failure, as individuals have some control over their 
participation  in private pensions either explicitly (for participants in 
defined  contribution  plans)  or  implicitly  (through  choice  of  em- 
ployer).  To  the  extent  that  individuals  adjust  their  pensions  for 
variation  in  social  security  annuities,  the  effective  annuity  market 
may  be  quite  large.  The  magnitude  of  that  adjustment  must  be 
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As an empirical proposition, it is important to ascertain the degree 
of discretion in individual private pension plan participation. We  can 
consider an auxiliary model of the form 
(y)  = yz;  -  *ps (Y);  - 
i 
where  +pel,  as before,  represents the adjustment of  private  pension 
annuities to involuntary  changes in  social security annuities. Again, 
apart from issues of substitutability (i.e., if  p = l), a value of zero for 
+ps  indicates no discretion in pension participation; +ps = - 1 indicates 
complete discretion. 
Given the assumption of market failure in the provision of nonpension 
annuities, four potential cases can be considered along the two dimen- 
sions of  (1) bequest motives and (2) discretion in private pension par- 
ticipation. As a first case, suppose that there is no bequest motive and 
that private pension participation is exogenous to individual decisions. 
The offset  to  nonpension  wealth  of  a change in  compulsory  social 
security annuities corresponds to the level described earlier; that is, 
the present value of anticipated (actuarially fair) social security benefits 
should displace nonpension wealth by more than dollar for dollar (in 
the absence of  capital market restrictions).  If  effective  replacement 
rates are nonlinear in earnings, high-income individuals are rationed in 
their access to social security annuities, and saving rates will rise with 
the level of  permanent income. 
Second, suppose that while there is no bequest motive, private pen- 
sion participation is completely under individual control. In the limit, 
if private pension annuities are also actuarially fair (p = 1 in eq. [171), 
there would be no restricted access to fair annuities, and WlI” would 
be independent of the level of Y.  Involuntary increases in compulsory 
annuities (social security) would be completely  reflected in reduced 
holdings of private pension annuities and not in the level of nonpension 
wealth. For intermediate versions of this second case, both a smaller 
offset to nonpension wealth from a change in social security benefits 
and a smaller effect of  I“ on WIT would be expected relative to the 
first case. 
The existence of a bequest motive changes the predicted effect of 
changes in compulsory social security annuities on the level of  non- 
pension wealth and complicates the distinction of ‘‘annuity rationing” 
effects from the data. The third and fourth cases embody the sort of 
“bequest motive” described above, evidenced by levels of nonpension 
wealth realtive to permanent income that rise with permanent income.2s 
The third case is described by the existence of an operative bequest 
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In this case, involuntary changes in social security participation will 
have no impact on nonpension wealth; the changes are counteracted 
by offsetting movements in private pension holdings. With discretion 
in pension participation, there is no restriction of “fair”  annuity pur- 
chases, so that a nonlinear relationship between WlP  and P  is traceable 
to the desire to leave bequests. 
The fourth case combines a bequest motive with exogenous partic- 
ipation in private pensions. Again, the reduction in nonpension wealth 
attendant to an increase in holdings of  social security annuities will be 
less than  in  the first case. An  observation  that  saving rates out of 
permanent  income  increase  with  permanent  income could reflect a 
combination  of  a bequest  motive  and  rationed  access  to  pension 
annuities. 
The cases are summarized with respect to interpretations of the offset 
parameter  a,  and nonlinearity  of  the ratio of  nonpension  wealth  to 
permanent income with respect to permanent income in figures 7.1 and 
7.2 below. Note that the predicted effects of changes in social security 
wealth and of changes in permanent income on individual wealth ac- 
cumulation depend greatly on assumptions about bequest motives and 
on the size of the effective private annuity market afforded by access 
to private pensions. In reality, of course, the degree of  discretion in 
private pension annuity holdings can vary anywhere between “none” 
and “complete.”  Estimation of the impact of changes in compulsory 
Complete 
Discretion in  No Discretion 
Pension  in Pension 
Bequest motive 
No bequest motive 
a, = 0 
a, = 0 
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a, > 1 
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social security annuities on holdings of private pension annuities (e.g., 
eq. [23] above) can help to allocate observed nonlinearities of saving 
rates with respect to the level of earnings between annuity rationing 
and bequest motives.29 
The theoretical results in sections 7.2-7.4  and the summary of im- 
plications in figures 7.1 and 7.2 factilitate interpretation of the coeffi- 
cients of (22). We can infer information about bequest motives and the 
impact of involuntary changes in social security annuities on nonpen- 
sion wealth. First, consider the case in which the wealth-earnings re- 
lationship exhibits little nonlinearity  in earnings. As  $ps  approaches 
minus one, the model implies no bequest motive (of the sort outlined 
here) and no substantial impact of  changes in  social security on the 
level of nonpension wealth. As $pps  approaches zero, the implication of 
no bequest motive is joined by the prediction of a significant impact 
of a change in social security on nonpension wealth. 
Second, suppose that the ratio of  wealth to permanent income in- 
creases with permanent income. As $pips  approaches unity in absolute 
value, a bequest motive is ratified (since discretionary pensions provide 
an effective annuity market); the impact of involuntary changes in social 
security will fall almost entirely on holdings of private pension annu- 
ities. The closer is $ps  to zero, the greater will be the impact of changes 
in  social security on nonpension wealth, so that the observed nonlin- 
earity in the wealth-income relationship reflects both a bequest motive 
and incomplete access to retirement annuities outside social security. 
7.6  Conclusions and Extensions 
Assessing the impact of social security and private pensions on in- 
dividual wealth accumulation is important for many analyses of welfare, 
capital formation, and equity in the distributions of income and wealth. 
Previous research efforts along the lines of Feldstein (1974) have ad- 
dressed the funding status of social security and pensions. The focus 
here is on insurance features of pension annuities with respect to the 
problem of uncertainty over length of life. 
The first part of the paper considers the introduction of social security 
into an economy with market failure in the provision of private an- 
nuities. The principal findings are three. First, in such a world, even 
an actuarially fair, fully funded social security system can substantially 
reduce  individual  saving,  though  individual  welfare  is initially  im- 
proved. Hence, partial equilibrium estimates of the impact of social 
security on saving which rely solely on the extent to which individuals 
earn a more than fair return on social security are underestimates of 
the true effect. 
Second, under current United States law, social security taxes and 
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individuals have incomplete access to the social security annuity sys- 
tem. Hence, even in the absence of an explicit bequest motive, the 
ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings would rise with the level of lifetime 
earnings. Constrained access to publicly provided pension  annuities 
may provide an impetus to the growth of private pension annuities. 
Third, the partial equilibrium impact of social security and private 
pension annuities on nonpension saving is reduced when initial endow- 
ments are considered. For example, to the extent that the introduction 
of social security reduces the size of accidental bequests, the net effect 
of  social  security on  the consumption of  succeeding generations  is 
mitigated.  In addition, general equilibrium considerations,  primarily 
the endogeneity of factor returns, can be expected to reverse part of 
the partial equilibrium impact. Because of  these two considerations, 
the impact of social security on the steady-state capital stock is likely 
to be smaller than the partial equilibrium impact. 
To provide an interpretation of econometric measures of the impact 
of  pensions on nonpension  saving, two additional considerations are 
important. Theoretical possibilities encompass assumptions along the 
dimensions of “perfectness” of private annuity markets (in this case, 
the ability to adjust private pension participation in response to invol- 
untary changes in social security annuities) and the presence or  absence 
of a bequest motive. Four cases are generated, as shown in figures 7.1 
and 7.2 in the text. The predicted effects of changes in social security 
wealth and of changes in permanent income on individual wealth ac- 
cumulation depend on assumptions about bequest motives and on the 
size of the effective private annuity market afforded by access to private 
pensions. 
Three immediate extensions to the models presented here are left as 
tasks for future research. First, when capital-market imperfections are 
added to the model, so that nonpension wealth is required to be non- 
negative in all periods, the impact of social security on lifetime con- 
sumption  is  reduced  substantially.  Significant welfare gains may be 
achievable by changing the structure of the payroll tax so as to shift 
intertemporally the burden of payroll taxation over the life cycle (see 
the discussion in Hubbard and Judd, 1985). Second, additional research 
is needed on private annuity markets to determine the actual extent of 
market failure. Finally, given the current political environment, intro- 
ducing uncertainty over future social security benefits may be appro- 
priate. That uncertainty would modify the wealth impacts derived here. 
The debate over the influence of pensions on individual saving brings 
together questions of  consumer choice under uncertainty and the ef- 
fectiveness of fiscal policy. Researching the relationships among social 
security, private pensions,  annuity markets, and bequests facilitates 
close empirical scrutiny of models of individual and aggregate saving, 
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In addition, while this paper has concentrated on annuity insurance, 
similar approaches could be used to study the impacts of  other social 
insurance programs on national saving. 
Notes 
1. Earlier studies for private pensions include those of Cagan (1963, Katona 
(1964),  and  Munnell  (1974).  Feldstein’s results have  by  no means gone un- 
challenged;  see, e.g., Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) and the reply  in  Feldstein 
(1982). Microeconomic (cross-section) evidence has generally been supportive 
of the proposition that social security has reduced individual saving. See Feld- 
stein and Pellechio (1979), Kotlikoff (l979b), Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981), 
Diamond and Hausman (1984), King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), and Hubbard 
(  1983). 
2. Empirical tests of  the life-cycle  model  under certainty have tested the 
hypothesis of a hump-shaped wealth-age profile, but results have by no means 
unambiguously validated the model. See, e.g., White (1978), Mirer (1979), and 
Kurz (1981). Even after controlling for the effects of permanent income, Blinder 
et al. (1981), Diamond and Hausman (1984), King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), 
and Hubbard (1983) found results only mildly supportive of the basic theory. 
Other studies have addressed the possibility of other motives for saving. Kotlikoff 
and Summers (1981) reject the ability of the life-cycle model to explain wealth 
accumulation in the United States, putting forth a major role for bequests. 
3. Abel (1985) takes up the intergenerational consequences of this point in 
a 2-period overlapping-generations model, with the implication that the insur- 
ance features of  social security  may reduce inequality in the distribution  of 
wealth. 
4. The precise  direction  of  the influence  of  this uncertainty  for saving is 
unclear. Heightened uncertainty over the length of life may lead to more saving 
(because  of  a longer than expected lifetime) or to less saving  (to maintain 
present consumption).  In the argument of Yaari (1965), two individuals with 
identical tastes, income, and investment opportunities are compared. The dif- 
ference between them is that one lives T periods for certain while the other 
faces an uncertain lifetime of  t periods, up to a maximum of T periods. Given 
a shorter expected life, uncertainty over length of life unambiguously  leads to 
increased initial consumption. Champernowne (1969) and Levhari and Mirman 
(1977), on the other hand, consider two agents with identical  expected lives 
but differing in the distribution of length of life. In either case, the impact of 
uncertainty  over the length  of  life on wealth accumulation  of  a risk-averse 
individual is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model. 
5. Note that this does not require that they actually die at the same time. 
6. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there will be no “pooling equi- 
librium,”  where all buy the same contract. They illustrate  conditions under 
which  a  “separating  equilibrium”  occurs, in  which  different  contracts are 
purchased by the risk groups. Following their argument and that of Riley (1979), 
if there is a fairly continuous distribution of survival probabilities, there is little 
hope for an equilibrium. Eckstein et al. (1985) consider the Pareto-improving 
potential of mandatory social security in the context of market failure in com- 
petitive insurance markets in the presence of adverse selection. 201  Uncertain Lifetimes, Pensions, and Individual Saving 
7. Previous work in this area in the context of pensions includes the con- 
tributions of Davies (1981) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1981). Davies used a life- 
cycle model under uncertain lifetime to address the phenomenon of slow dis- 
saving in retirement. The presence of pensions in his simulation model (using 
Canadian data) reduced, but by no means eliminated, the effect of uncertainty 
on retirement consumption. In the model of Sheshinski and Weiss, the ultimate 
impact of  social security  on saving depends on the availability  of a private 
annuity  market. (The problem  will  arise  here  in  sec. 7.4 in  the context of 
discretion in private pension participation.) They found that, at the optimum, 
Yaari’s (1965) result holds,  namely, that private  savings are reserved for be- 
quests, while social security benefits are used to finance retirement consumption. 
8. The actuarially fair benefit is constructed with respect to economy-wide 
survival probabilities. It is true that individuals who believe they will die “young” 
will want to purchase less than the “average optimal” amount of social security 
annuities, while those who expect to live a long time will want more. Both 
groups are better off, however, with the mandatory social security than without 
it, since in its absence, adverse selection is assumed to  foreclose the possibility 
of a market of private annuities. A discussion of the potential separating equi- 
libria in the private provision of annuities which may arise after the imposition 
of mandatory  social security is given in Eckstein et al. (1985). 
9. While the imposition of the social security system increases lifetime re- 
sources, nothing has been said about the optimal tax rate. Current law prohibits 
the explicit leverage of anticipated  social security benefits. The ability to im- 
plicitly borrow against future benefits will depend on differences in wo  (differ- 
ences in ability to procure “unsecured” loans). Under the assumption of com- 
plete (explicit and implict) nonmarketability of benefits, we can demonstrate 
that there is an interior solution (0 < t, < 1) for the individual’s optimal tax 
rate (a sufficient statistic of participation  as long as benefits  are actuarially 
fair). The intuition is that while the purchase of  “social  security retirement 
annuities”  increases resources available in old age, it decreases the resources 
available for current consumption. 
10. Uncertainty over future social security benefits would mitigate the effect 
shown here. Watson (1982) discusses the influence of uncertainty over benefits 
in assessing the impact of social security on saving. Merton et al. (1984) show 
that  many  private  pension  integration  arrangements remove much of  this 
uncertainty. 
11. A retirement age of 65 was assumed. Probabilities for survival were taken 
from Faber (1982). 
12. This effect is most pronounced in the absence of explicit capital-market 
restrictions. With  no initial endowment (and, hence, binding restrictions on 
the  nonmarketability  of  social  security  when  young),  relative  impacts on 
“working-period’’  and “retirement-period’’  consumption  will depend on the 
relationship of the individual’s actual and optimal tax rate (participation). The 
importance of (accidental) bequests as intergenerational links will be discussed 
latkr. 
13. This nonlinearity has surfaced in some recent studies of the impact of 
social security on saving. See, e.g., Diamond and Hausman (1982) and Hubbard 
(1983). 
14.  For  a more  complete discussion  of  the implications of  the choice  of 
parameter values, see Levhari and Mirman (1977) or Davies (1981). 
15. As in table 7.1, survival probabilities are taken from Faber (1982). 
16. Note that if participation in social security is rationed by income, low- 
income  individuals have  more of  their retirement dissaving  in  the form of 
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individuals. This analysis assumes that annuity and non-annuity holdings are 
perfect substitutes in dissaving. The studies cited in the beginning of the paper 
have found good but not perfect substitutability of social security for nonpen- 
sion wealth in accumulation.  Empirical evidence in Hubbard (1986) suggests 
that the substitutability is greatest for high-income individuals. 
17. In a world with capital-market restrictions, then, a social security system 
of this type may increase saving, since received initial bequests are more liquid 
than anticipated social security benefits. The impact of social security on in- 
tergenerational transfers is an important component of the system’s net effect 
on individual saving. 
18. The implicit assumption, of course, is that the parent dies at the beginning 
of the child’s (optimizing) life, age 20 here. This assumption is made to  highlight 
the point that the existence of social security for the previous generation mit- 
igates the impact of the present generation’s participation in social security on 
its own wealth accumulation. More general assumptions about the timing of a 
testator’s death would  complicate  expressions like (14)  in the text, but the 
qualitative point would remain. 
19. This damping through intergenerational transfers of the impact of social 
security on wealth accumulation is mitigated if  “children”  earn more on av- 
erage than their “parents”  (because of  productivity growth). 
20.  The consumption of individuals of each age can be calculated from eq. 
(18a) and (lgb), given the initial wage. The growth rate of the population will 
determine the relative number of persons at each age. Aggregate consumption 
can be calculated by summing consumption over ages, weighted by the relative 
population size. 
21. Kotlikoff’s (1979a) analysis also incorporates the influence of social se- 
curity on retirement age, which is taken as exogenous here. To the extent that 
social security lowers the desired retirement age, the partial equilibrium wealth 
replacement effect of  social security on saving is dampened. 
22. The calculation was performed  as follows. Let Y,  YL, and n represent 
total income, labor income, and the population growth rate, respectively; then 
L 
Given the assumed values for g,  r, n, and 6 in the text, -  = 0.82. 
23.  The idea here is that an individual who thinks he will live a long time 
would buy several small annuities rather than one large one in order to mis- 
represent his assessment of his longevity. Companies know his participation 
in social security, but not the extent to which he has obtained insurance from 
other private sources. Pauly (1974) and Wilson (1977) discuss certain situations 
in which market equilibria might occur after a compulsory insurance program 
is imposed. 
24.  Lazear (1983) has focused particularly  on this point, emphasizing the 
role of pensions in influencing turnover, retirement, and investment in human 
capital. Many arguments for the existence of private pensions have emphasized 
their favorable federal tax treatment. Tax treatment cannot be the complete 
explanation, since defined contribution plans would dominate. Defined benefit 
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plans are instead prevalent. Munnell (1982) emphasizes both the tax benefits 
(to employers and to employees)  and the inadequacy of  social  security  in 
explaining the growth of private pension plans. 
25. This ignores the possibility that firms may be willing to offer “more than 
fair”  plans  to achieve  some other impact  on worker behavior.  See Lazear 
(1983). 
26. This is just the characteristic of “integration”  of the benefits of social 
security and private pension annuities. Since the passage of the Revenue Act 
of  1942, Congress has allowed public (social security) and private benefits to 
be considered together in determining whether a private plan discriminates in 
favor of low-income workers. For descriptions of typical integration provisions 
and discussions of their prevalence in the United States pension system, see 
Munnell (1982) and Kotlikoff and Smith (1983). 
27. Note that empirical evidence of saving rates increasing with income does 
not validate the hypothesis the bequests are a luxury good (even if  data on 
bequests are known), because of, among other things, rationing of the purchase 
of pension annuities by income. 
28. Such a bequest motive is usually grounded in work in the human capital 
literature (see, e.g.,  Becker and Tomes  1976, 1979). That is, if  human capital 
investment initially yields a higher rate of return than that on financial assets, 
parents who “care” about their children invest first in human capital up to the 
level at which the returns to additional investment just equal the market return. 
Further transfers are exclusively financial. Hence observed (financial) bequests 
will  be higher for children whose parents had significant resources than for 
children with access to low parental resources. Despite serious data limitations, 
there have been some recent efforts to estimate the relationship between be- 
quests and lifetime resources. The finding that the ratio of bequests to earnings 
rises with the level of earnings is corroborated in the careful empirical study 
of Menchik and David (1983). 
29. The problem of isolating a relationship between wealth (or bequests) and 
lifetime resources is further complicated by the fact that price effects may be 
present as well (e.g.,  a correlation  between  earnings  and after-tax  financial 
returns). Government retirement saving policy  can bring about those price 
effects-e.g.,  tax-favored treatment of IRAs and Keogh plans (see Hubbard 
1984). To the extent that changes in government pension policy involve trade- 
offs among policy options (e.g., liberalized ceilings on tax-deductible IRA or 
Keogh contributions in exchange for a reduction  in social security benefits), 
the stability of any observed relationship between wealth and earnings is all 
the more tenuous. 
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Comment  Olivia S. Mitchell 
In recent years there has been a great deal of attention devoted to the 
effect of social security on savings, initiated primarily by Martin Feld- 
stein’s seminal paper  10 years ago on this topic. The paper I am to 
discuss today is very much in the mainstream tradition. Hubbard’s goal 
is to discuss the implications of new theoretical structures for empirical 
modeling of the effect of social security on savings. The paper does 
not actually report estimates; instead Hubbard refers readers to others’ 
work as well as to his own previous papers. 
In commenting on this paper, I wish to focus on one empirical and 
two theoretical matters that I believe warrant further attention, given 
the proliferation of studies following Feldstein’s. Regarding theory, two 
matters deserving more discussion are the nature of uncertainty mod- 
eled, and the degree to which theoretical models are informative about 
economic institutions they purport to explain. Regarding empirics, I 
will focus on the econometric links between theoretically preferred 
savings functions and equations usually used for empirical estimation. 
Each point is taken up in turn. 
7.C.  1  The Nature of  Uncertainty in Social Security/Savings Models 
In this paper Hubbard contrasts the life-cycle consumption path aris- 
ing in a certainty world with that arising when the consumer is uncertain 
about when he will  die. This type of uncertainty  is tractable  in the 
standard life-cycle framework, for it reduces to an additional discount 
factor in the lifetime utility function. As in his previous working paper, 
Hubbard posits a utility function separable across periods and with 
constant relative risk aversion. The only argument affecting utility is 
consumption; retirement is assumed to be exogenous. 
Hubbard’s findings.  in this setup seem sensible given earlier work he 
cites by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), and 
Eckstein et al. (1985). If no annuities are available, people will oversave 
for retirement so that they do not outlive their assets. If  fair public or 
private annuities are available, individuals smooth consumption by buy- 
ing insurance (where the demand for insurance depends on interest and 
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time preference rates, risk aversion, and expected mortality patterns). 
An institution enabling risk-averse individuals to avoid “living too long” 
increases lifetime utility and consumption as compared to the no-in- 
surance case; thus  insurance  will  reduce  lifetime savings.  Thus  on 
theoretical grounds, Hubbard predicts  that an actuarially fair social 
insurance system reduces savings. 
One question arises at this juncture:  What has been  sacrificed to 
generate unambiguous theoretical predictions regarding the effect of a 
social insurance scheme on savings? To begin with, I would find useful 
some sensitivity analysis using other functional forms for the utility 
function (e.g., what happens if utility includes leisure as well as con- 
sumption), the tax structure (e.g., what happens if  taxes are progres- 
sive), and so forth. 
Equally important, I question whether uncertainty about when one 
will die is one of  the more important and/or interesting forms of un- 
certainty older individuals face. The answer appears to be both yes 
and no. Practically speaking, fear of living too long does seem to mo- 
tivate a great deal of behavior including the peculiar savings patterns 
detected among older workers by Kotlikoff et al. (1982). On the other 
hand, this is only one of several types of uncertainty-generating savings 
behavior. Champernowne’s model (1969), as in Levhari and Mirman 
(1977), considers differences across individuals in the distribution of 
the length of life. Watson (1982) and Merton (in this volume) build in 
uncertainty over wages, prices, and even future social security benefits. 
Many analysts in the implicit contracts literature emphasize uncertainty 
over work productivity, perhaps because of health surprises or mac- 
roeconomic surprises (e.g., Nalebuff and Zeckhauser 1985). Not least 
important is the fact that many private pensions are underfunded, which 
burdens workers with different types of uncertainty. 
No doubt most listeners could extend this tabulation of sources of 
uncertainty not included in Hubbard’s current model. Even if we stop 
here, however, including just these features would already complicate 
matters so greatly that the ability to make clear-cut predictions probably 
would be lost. For instance, it appears that allowing for variability in 
social insurance benefit levels means that such a system will have an 
ambiguous effect on savings; so too does allowing somewhat different 
formulations of mortality patterns. The point is that, in this case, simple 
theory generates unambiguous predictions-and  yet the simple theory 
is far removed from processes generating empirical data. 
A purist coming to this conclusion would of course give up further 
prospect of empirical work, and perhaps this is the shortest path to 
heaven. On the other hand, Hubbard  (and I) would actually like to 
evaluate how  social insurance schemes affect  savings-theoretically 
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At this juncture, 1 believe that a most  useful product would be a 
paper which systematically and carefully examines the implications of 
various kinds of annuity structures on savings, using several different 
formulations  of  uncertainty.  I  have earlier alluded to studies which 
could be used as pieces of the larger puzzle; there are no doubt others. 
The first goal of  such a project would be to derive savings functions 
under alternative scenarios which could then be compared across model 
types, as Hubbard  has begun to do with one particular uncertainty 
setup. A second goal would be to assess whether these savings func- 
tions (a) generate testable implications for empirical work, and (b) enable 
the econometrician to determine which model(s) is (are) more com- 
patible with the data. I believe that the time is right for such a com- 
prehensive exercise, ten years after Feldstein’s seminal piece. 
7.C.2  The Link Between Theory and Institutions 
Pressing further in the quest for empirically testable models of social 
security and savings, I turn now to a discussion of several facts about 
the world generating the data before us. One problem is that the social 
security system as it exists in the United States is far from the actu- 
arially neutral insurance plan  Hubbard  models.  Since its inception, 
social security has operated as an underfunded “pay-as-you-go” method 
of transferring income across generations. Hurd and Shoven (1985) find 
that current retirees receive a positive real rate of return of well over 
5%,  implying that  contributions to social security were  a better in- 
vestment than any other financial asset for that generation. In addition, 
half of all money contributed to social security avoided income taxes 
(until 1983), another factor making social security appealing as a savings 
vehicle. Under these circumstances, I would rephrase Hubbard’s ques- 
tion: Why did people save anything at all, outside of the social security 
system? Most current retirees are not at the benefit maximum and could 
have saved more via social security. In general, models which assume 
an actuarially neutral social insurance scheme cannot begin to explain 
savings patterns over the last 40 years. 
Another fact that should be recognized in empirically motivated the- 
ory is that retirement behavior is endogenous. Hubbard’s model, like 
many in the public finance literature,  assumes that one’s retirement 
age is not subject to choice. This simplification is clearly useful since 
it generates unambiguous theoretical predictions. On the other hand, 
a more general framework could easily reverse his conclusions. For 
instance, workers might retire earlier and consume more leisure rather 
than reducing savings when social security comes into play. Research 
by Crawford and Lilien (1981) is informative along these lines.  The 
point, of  course, is that allowing retirement  to be  endogenous may 
weaken or even break the link between social security and savings, a 
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A third  and related fact that an applied theorist should include in 
modeling is that an individual’s wealth value of  pensions and social 
security depends on when he retires. Many analysts have overlooked 
this institutional fact because existing data sets make it difficult to see. 
However, my  own work  with  Gary Fields (1984)  shows that  social 
security wealth for the average 60-year-old in our LRHS sample was 
only 70% as large as it would have been if the worker waited to retire 
untii age 65. Nonneutral patterns show up in private pensions as well; 
for instance, the pension wealth for a retiree at age 65 was 80% smaller 
than pension wealth at age 60 in our sample of covered workers. These 
total income values were computed for the same person at two different 
points in time, so they are not contaminated by selectivity bias present 
in  self-reporting data. Using other data, Kotlikoff and Wise (in this 
volume) indicate similar patterns. Theoretical models should allow for 
these nonneutralities so that estimating equations using actual wealth 
values  move  beyond  single  ‘‘social  security  and  pension  wealth” 
variables. 
7.C.3  Econometric Links 
Hubbard’s theoretical model generates two savings equations labeled 
(1 la) and (1  1 b) in his paper. Generally speaking, the dependent variable 
in each case is the ratio of accumulated wealth at time t,  to lifetime 
earnings.  Explanatory  variables  include  lifetime pension  and  social 
security savings, which enter nonlinearly along with interest rate and 
other parameters.  The form of  the function should vary before and 
after retirement, which accounts for the two savings equations. 
Empirical studies in this genre never really confront these equations 
(or even facsimiles thereof) with data. Instead, linearizations such as 
Hubbard’s equation (15) are employed, where nonpension wealth val- 
ues are regressed on arbitrary measures of pension wealth and other 
variables. Hubbard’s model should be applauded for including the pri- 
vate pension term since many earlier formulations have ignored this 
important form of saving. However, the fact remains that the econo- 
metric links between theory and data are weak. For instance, theory 
nowhere motivates the addition of  an error term. In addition he ex- 
plicitly notes that theory does not imply that right-hand-side variables 
should enter additively. A great deal of work remains to be done in 
carefully linking theory and data. 
7.C.4  Concluding Remarks 
Feldstein’s model of social security and savings has attained its tenth 
birthday in  good health, judging from the important and interesting 
extensions that writers such as Hubbard are devising. Hubbard’s paper 
is indeed a contribution to this growing field; worth special mention is 
his recognition of the jointness in social security, private pension, and 210  R. Glenn Hubbard 
other asset accumulation decisions. I especially liked his suggestion 
that private  pensions may be  integrated  with  social security benefit 
formulas to avoid “annuity  rationing.”  More implications should be 
teased out of the framework in order to explain the data, and 1 am sure 
Hubbard will do so in future work. 
I would also encourage analysts to cast wider nets if  they wish to 
understand the quantitative effects of social security on savings. It is 
simpler not to focus on all of the different forms of uncertainty affecting 
older individuals’ behavior, and the institutional features of  social se- 
curity and pensions as well.  On the other hand, an empiricist  must 
concern himself with the processes actually generating data. 
I would like to add one more suggestion in closing. To  date, appar- 
ently no empirical study has explored how savings patterns respond to 
realizations of uncertainty through time.  It seems quite important to 
embed empirical savings models in a dynamic context. This type of 
analysis would be a valuable  and welcome extension of  Feldstein’s 
seminal work. 
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